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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
tli;t they must take it subject to all the liens and conditions arising from
tile contract upon which the property was received by the agents.
Neither the United States, in the prosecution of these suits, or the
courts of England in deciding them, expressed the slightest doubt that
the title to the property not originally owned by the United States had
been acquired by the Confederate government, which was in the hands
of its agents. And I submit that a response by those courts to the claim
of the United States, that the insurgent government, being illegal in its
origin and continuance, could neither take, hold nor transfer title to per-
sonal property would not have been acquiesced in, nor deemed respect-
ful by our government. And I submit respectfully that the eloquent
denunciation of the wickedness of the rebellion, contained in the opinion
of the majority, is no legal answer to the demand of the 'claimant for the
proceeds of his property seized and sold by our government, when that
government long since pardoned the only offence of which that claimant
was guilty, and thus gave him the assurance that h should stand in the
courts of his country in as good plight and condition as any citizen, who
had never sinned against its authority.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.1
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.'
SUPREME COURT OF IOWA.
3
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. 4
ACTION. See Duress.
Fr-audulent Assistance to Debtor in defeating Creditor's LJen.-A
party who purchases goods and chattels of a judgment-debtor, with
knowledge of the creditor's judgment and execution, which is a lien
thereon, for the purpose of aiding the debtor to defraud the plaintiff in
the judgment, where such purchase is an injury to such plaintiff by
reason of the removal of the property and the insolvency of the debtor,
is liable to the creditor in an action on the case for the damages occa-
sioned by such act: Powers v. Wheeler et al., 63 Ill.
AGENT. See Factor.
Sale by Agent in his Own Name.-If an agent sell and deliver per-
sonal property in payment of debts contracted by himself, in his own
name, to a third party, without disclosing his agency, the right of the
purchaser cannot be disturbed by the principal or his attaching creditors:
Koch v. Willi, 63 Ill.
1 From ion. N. L. Freeman, Reporter ; to appear in 63 Ill. Reports.
2 From Jas. B. Black, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 45 Ind. Reports.
3 From Edw. 1H. Stiles, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 36 Iowa Reports.
4 From Ilon. Al. M. Granger, Reporter; to appear in 2 t O:iio Sr. Reports.
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AN MALS. See Railroa.
Intpoudi g-O,(iace.-Whero a plaintiff's horses escaped from
his enclosure agiinst his will, and he immediately went in search of
them to put them up, but befbre lie found themi they were seized by the
police-constable of the town where they were found running who im-
pounded them under the ordinance" of the town ; Held, that under such
circumstances the horses were not running at large in the legal sense of
the term, and that the constable had no right to detain them from the
owner: Kinder v. Gillespie, 63 I11.
B1Lr.s AND NOTES.
onsileration.-A promissory note given in compromise of a doubtful
claim is supported by a sufficient consideration. It is not necessary that
the claim should be valid at law or in equity: Keeffe v. Vogle, 36 Iowa.
Parol Restrictions i 2 awsfer.-A parol agreement in the endorse-
ment of a promissory note to the effect that the transfer should be with-
out recourse upon the endorser, cannot be interposed as a defence against
a subsequent bond fide holder without notice. Nor would the case be
varied by the Iiict that it was transferred to such holder by mere de-
livery and that he declared on the prior endorsement as though made to
himself: Skinner v. Chkurch, 36 Iowa.
BOND.
Execution of-2otice.-It is necessary to the valid execution of a
bond that it should be subscribed and delivered: Wild Cut Branch v.
Ball, 45 Ind.
To subscribe is to write the name under, to write the name at the
bottom or end of a writing: P(.
Where the name of a party appears in the body of a bond, but is not
subscribed to it, there is not as to such party a valid execution of the
bond, and lie cannot be held liable thereon, on the supposition that he
adopted the name in the body of the bond as a signing of it, even if the
name wrs written there by himself: Md.
If an instrumnent, in the body thereof, purports to be signed by a prin-
cipal and his sureties, but. when delivered is not signed by the principal,
the obligee is chargeable with notice that it is imperfect; and the sure-
ties may show that they did not assent to its delivery before being
signed by the principal: Id.
Sureties may agree to become liable, and assent to the delivery of a
bond to the obligee, without the name of the principal being signed
thereto: 11.
COmmoMrsE. See Bills and .,otcs.
CONTRACT. See Bills and Notes; Eoi'lencc.
Failure of Consdcration-Plea of.-To an action on a promissory
note the defendant pleaded that the sole consideration of the note was
the ice to be formed on the ponds at the reservoir of the plaintiffs during
the winter next following, and, in consideration of the ice so to be formed,
he executed the note; that no ice of any value was formed on said
ponds during said winter, &c. .ield, that the plea was bad on general
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demurrer, the facts presenting i) defence to the note, there being no
warranty or guaranty that tiny ice womhl tIrin or that it would be of
any particular value: lbwnsed v. lVater Commissioners, 63 111.
CONTRAOTOR. See Negligence.
COURTS.
Time of Session-Presumpt ion in fiivor of Regularity-Parol Evi-
dence.-The time of the commencement of a termn of court is to be de-
termined by the record of the court, in connection with the statute
under which the term is held, and parol evidence is not admissible fbr
the purpose: Hemminway v. Davis el al., 24 Ohio St.
In determining the question of priority between the lien of a judg-
ment and the lien of a mortgage filed for record on the first day of the
term, where the record fails to show the hour at which the court met,
the session of the court will be presumed to have commenced at 10
o'clock A. M., that being the hour, on the first day of the term, fixed
by statute for the return of the venire.s for the grand and petit juries,
and at which time the court, where a different hour has not been pre-
scribed, ought to have opened: Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Larceny.-Thc bringing into this state by the thief, of goods stolen
in the dominion of Canada, or other foreign country, is not larceny in
this state: Staidey v. The State, 24 Ohio St.
Sale of Intoxicating Liquors.-The gist of the offence defined by the
fourth section of the Act of May 1st 1854, to provide against the evils
resulting front the sale of intoxicating liquors, is the keeping of a place
of public resort where intoxicating liquors are sold in violation of law,
and not that the place kept is otherwise of any particular description:
O'Keefe v. The State, 24 Ohio St.
Where the place alleged to have been kept by the accused is described
as a room, no case of variance is presented, although the proof given in
support of the charge shows that the room kept was a cellar or a gro-
cery : Id.
Indictment-Of the Averment as to the Ownership of the Property.-
The rule is, that property vested in a body of persons ought not to be
laid in an indictment charging a party with the larceny of the same, as
the property of that body, unless such body is incorporated, but should
be described as belonging to the individuals composing the company:
Wallace v. The People, 63 Ill.
So where, in an indictment fbr larceny, it was charged that the pro.
perty alleged to have been stolen was the property of-the " American
Merchants' Union Express Company," in the absence of an averment
that such company was a corporation, it was held that the ownership of
the property was defectively stated, and the overruling of defendant's
motion to quash the indictment on that ground was fatal to the judg-
ment: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Action; Mortgage.
DuREss.
Voluntary or Compulsory Payment- Taxes Illegally Assessed.-Where
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a party paid taxes illegally assessed, and the only compulsion arose from
the I4cc that his laud was liable to sale under a void judgment, which
could pass no title, it was held, that such payment could not be regarded
as iade under duress, and an action for money had and received would
not lie against the county treasurer, to whom the taxes were paid, to
recover thetu back: Swanston v. hjams, 63 Ill.
EQuITY. See Title.
EVIDENCE. See Courts; Surety.
Opinions of Experts.-Where the contract for the construction of a
building stipulated that it should have a wood cornice with brackets,
but without stipulating whether the cornice should be placed on the
wall ahove the upperj,ist or below that point, or what width of cornice
or length o" bracket there should be, it was held competent, in an action
hy the contractor tfr extra work in running walls above the joist, to admit
the testiniony of other builders as to these matters, and to show by them
that in order to properly place a cornice of a proper width on the build-
ing according to) contract, the walls should have been built up to the
point they were built to and fur which ilaintiff claimed extra pay:
Ibtcer v. Tenney et al., 36 Iowa.
.Ecperts.-To render admissible the opinion of one as an expert, the
pursuit in which the witness claims to be such must be one of science,
skill, trade or the like. A brakeman on a railroad is not an expert of
such a character as to qualify him to give his opinions upon matters
pertaining thereto : Hamilton v. R. le. Co., 36 Iowa.
If the consequences of actions, or combinations of circumstances,
cannot be understood by those not possessing skill or peculiar knowledge
thereif, opinions of experts are admissible. On the other hand, if the
facts in the evidence are of such character that conclusions therefrom
may be reached by the jury without skill or peculiar knowledge, then
the opinions of experts are not admissible : Ld.
f'rrige Contrat-nstruction as to Eeidenc.-On the trial of an
action 1br the breach of a contract to marry, the court gave this in-
struction : "In this suit the jury may infer a promise to marry to have
been made by the defendant, 1st, front the conduct of the parties ; 2d,
front the circumstances which usually attend an engagement to marry,
as visiting, the understanding of' friends and relatives, preparations for
marriage, and the reception of the defendant by the fhmily of the
plaintiff as a suitor." 1hel, that the instruction was erroneous. It by
no means follows, because a gentleman is the suitor and visits a lady fre-
quently, that a marriage engagement exists between them : Walmsley v.
Robinson, 63 Ill.
FACTOa.
Riht to sell Goods where Advances have been vzade.-Where goods
were consigned to a factor for sale, without instructions as to the price
f*r which they were to be sold, and the tlictor advanced money to the
consignor to an amount greater than the value of the goods, and, after
such advances, the consignor instructed the factor not to sell for less
than a certain price, as he could do better by having the goods returned,
and the factor thereupon informed the consignor that the goods had not
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been sold, and that it was doubtful whether they could be sold at the
price fixed, and that he would await further instructions, stating that if
the consignor wished to remove the goods, an account of the advances
would be rendered, and the amount could i be remitted at the time the
goods were ordered to be removed, to which the consignor made no
response; ifed, that after the lapse of a reasonable time, the factor
might sell the goods for thd best price he could get in the market:
Mooney v. Masscr, 45 Ind.
FENc.. See Railroad.
FoREIGN JUDOMENT.
Authentication ofn-Jursdiction-Personal Judgment.-A transcript
of a judgment of the county court of the state of Virginia, before its
division by the formation of the state of West Virginia therefrom, au-
thenticated by a certificate of the circuit cqiirt of West Virginia, show-
ing that said county court of the state of Virginia was abolished or dis-
continued, and its records and proceedings transferred to said circuit court
of the state of West Virgini., and that he. as the clerk of the said named
court, is the lawful custodian of the records and proceedings of the said
late county court, &c., and further authenticated by the presiding judge
of said circuit court, was held sufficiently attested in an action thereon
in this state : Darrah v. Matson, 36 Iowa.
The fact that it appears from the recordi that the proceeding was com-
menced by attachment on the ground of the non-residence of the de-
fendant, will not invalidate a personal judgment rendered in the action
when it further appears that he was personally served: 11.
Nor would the jurisdiction of the court be disturbed, nor the judg-
ment rendered invalid by the fact that the defendant was not served the
number of days required by law. This would simply be a case of de-
fective service, instead of no service: d.
The courts of the state of Iowa may acquire lawful jurisdiction of the
person of a resident of a sister state by the service of original process
upon him while within this state: Id.
FRAUD. See Action.
FORmER ADJUDICATION.
NAot binding on Strangers-Priority of Liens.-Tn a suit by a judg-
ment creditor, to marshal the several liens on real estate, and to dis-
tribute the proceeds of the sale thereof among such liens, according to
their respective priorities, the fund still being under the control of the
court, the fact that in a former suit between two of the defendants, to
which the plaintiff was not a party, a decree had been rendered, giving
t the junior lienholder priority, cannot be pleaded as an estoppel to
preclude the court from awarding to each lien priority according to its
merits, the decree in the former suit having been rendered without the
presence of the necessary parties, and the fund being insufficient to dis-
charge all the liens: Hemminway v. Davis et al., 24 Ohio St.
GUARANTY.
Notice-Insolvency.-A guarantor ic entitled to notice of the default
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of the party, the performance of whose contract he has guaranteed:
Gaff v. Sims, 45 Ind.
Certain parties guaranteed the performance of a contract for the pur-
chase of k lot of cattle and the payment therefor. For eighteen months
after the maturity of the contract the principal was solvent, but after-
ward, and before suit, he became insolvent. No notice of his default
was given to the guarantors. Thel, that the guarantors were dis-charged : Id.
INFANT.
Contract-False Representations as to Age.-The contract of *an in-
fant in relation to personal property may be avoided by him during
his minority: Carpenter v. Carenter, 45 Ind.
That the inijint falsely represented that he was of full age, will not
render his contract valid, nor will it estop him from avoiding the con-
tract, though it may constitute a cause of action for the tort: Pd.
Where an infant has exchanged property with an adult, lie is not
bound to tender back the property lie has received before suing for the
value or the possession of the property given by him to the adult: Hd.
On the avoidance of such contract by the infant, the adult is entitled
to have the property received by the infant, in whatever condition it
may be, and if the property received by the infant has been injured
while in his possession, if the law furnishes any remedy, it is an action
for the tort: Rd.
It is not necessary, in order to give effect to the disaffirmance of the
deed or contract of an infant, that the other party should be placed in
statu qu o: 11.
INTEREST. See Surety.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See Criminal Law; Nuisance.
JOINT DEBTOR. See Partnership.
Merger-Sat6.ftct ion.-W here several Judgments have been rendered
against parties jointly and severally liable on the same obligation, and
one of the judgments has been paid, such payment is a satisfaction of
all the judgments, except as to costs, and when suits are still being
prosecuted against some of the parties liable, the payment of such judg-
ment may be pleaded in bar of the further maintenance of the pending
actions: First National Bank v. Indianapolis, &c., Co., 45 Ind.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Mortgage.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Probable Cause-.Yolle Prosequi.-The defendant in a criminal prose.
cution was found guilty; but a new trial was granted, and subsequently
a nolle prosequi was duly entered, and the defendant was thereupon dis-
charged. Held, that this was such a determination of the case as to
enable the accused to sue for malicious prosecution. Held, also, that the
finding of guilty having been set aside, it was no evidence of probable
cause: Ri'cter v. Koster, 45 Ind.
The defendant in an action for malicious prosecution was before the
grand jury, not voluntarily, but in obedience to a subpcena, and, upon
VOL. XXIII.-8
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being questioned, testified to what he believed to be true in reference to
a criminal offence supposed to have been committed by the plaintiff,
and thereafter took no part in prosecuting the criminal charge. Held,
that mialice could not be inferred from these facts : Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Negligence.
Railroads- When Liable .for Injury to One .Employee through the
Fault of Another.- If a servant of a railroad company be injured
through the incompetency and uuskilfulness of a fellow-servant, or in
consequence of defects in machinery or tracks, and the company be
guilty or negligence in the employment and retention of such agent, or
in the construction and repair of its machinery and track, it is liable in
damages: 0. & A. R. R. Co. v. Sullivan Admx., 63 Ill.
Habitual intemperance of a conductor, under circumstances bringing
knowledge thereof to his employers, is sufficient to render them liable
for injury resulting therefrom : LI.
MORTGAGE.
Foreclosure-Decree of Immeliate Possession.-A decree on bill to
foreclose a mortgage after finding the amount due, directing its payment
within a certain time, and ordering a sale of the premises in default of
such payment, further ordered: " that said purchaser or purchasers
have immediate possession of said premises as soon as the same are sold,
and that the purchaser or purchasers have the proper writ and process
issued in this cause to put them in possession of said premises, &c."
Held, that the award of immediate possession and a writ of assistance
was erroneous. The purchaser is not entitled to possession before the
execution of the master's deed to hini: .Myers et al. v. Murray et al.,
63 Ill.
Possession of Mortgagor not adverse-Presumption of Pagment from
Zapse of Time-The possession of a mortgagor, or, of those claiming
under him, continuing in the occupancy of the mortgaged premises, ac-
knowledging the subsistence of the mortgage, is not adverse to the rights
of the mortgagee, and will not ripen into a title superior to the mort-
gage: Allen et al. v. Ecerly, 20 Ohio St.
Where lapse of time is not pleaded in bar to an action, but is relied
on merely as evidence of the payment of a debt, it can only raise a pre-
sumption of such payment, which presumption may be rebutted by
other circumstances, showing that the debt is not paid: Id.
A party invoking affirmative relief based on the alleged payment of a
debt, must establish the fact of payment ; such relief will not be granted
upon a presumption of payment arising alone from lapse of time.
Though such presumption may be successfully used as a shield, it is not
equally available as a weapon of attack : 11.
As between the parties to a mortgage, the legal title, after condition
broken, is vested in the mortgagee ; and where he devises his interest
in the mortgaged premises to a trustee for the benefit of his children
and their heirs, the mortgagor, without having paid the mortgage-debt,
is not entitled, in an action against the cestuis gue trust alone, to a
decree against them for a relinquishment of their interest in the mort-
gaged premises: Id.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
_Aitisace-Stractures Overhanging Sideval_.--The cornice of'a build-
ing which projects over a sidewalk in a city, and which is being con-
structed in such a manner as to be dangerous to persons using the side-
walk, is a nuisance : Grove v. City of Fort WVagne, 45 Ind.
The city has power under the statute to abate such nuisance, and if
it fails to do so after notice to the proper authorities of its dangerous
chitracter, and takes no precaution to prevent injury to parties using the
sidewalk, it will be liable in damages to a person injured by the falling
of such cornice: id.
The power of a city over its streets and the right of the public to
them extends upward indefinitely for the purpose of their preservation,
sale use and enjoyment; and the duty of a city in this respect is com-
mensurate with its power: ]d.
NEGLIGENCE.
Comparatice and Contribtory.-The doctrine of comparative negli-
gence is discarded; that of contributory negligence prevails: Johnson
v. Tillson, 36 Iowa.
In an action for personal injuries, the court instructed the jury that
defendant was liable for his negligence, unless they found that plaintiff
was "equally guilty of negligence with defendant." delti, that the in-
struction was erroneous as announcing the doctrine of comparative neg-
ligence : Id.
Excaration in Street by Cotractor.-Where the owner of a lot in a
city contracts with a skilful, reliable and competent builder for the erec-
tion of a house thereon, including a cellar under the sidewalk in the
street, and surrenders possession of the property to the builder for the
purposes of the work, and the work is not done'under the direction of
the owner, and injury ensues to a third person from. the negligence of
the contractor and not of the owner, such contractor is not the servant
of the owner, and he alone is liable for the injury inflicted: Pfau v.
W1llianson, 63 Ill.
NUISANCE. See Municipal Corporation.
Legislative Power-Place where intoxicatihg Liquors are Sold.-The
legislature h.ts the power to declare a place where intoxicating liquors
are sold. in violation of law, to be drunk on the premises: a nuisance:
McLaughlin v. The State, 45 Ind.
It is neither a cruel nor an unusual punishment to adjudge the abate-
ment of a nuisance. Such a judgment is authorized in either a civil or
a criminal action : P.
PARTNERSIIIP.
What Consttutes.-The joining of two or more persons in a single
adventure, in which the profits are to be equally divided, does not con-
stitute them copartners in such sense as will oust a court of law of its
jurisdiction in respect thereto: H'urley v. Walton, Adrnr., 63 Ill.
Discharge of one Joint Debtor-Pending the dissolution of a part-
nership, a creditor received the notes of the several partners for their
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respective portions of a partnership debt standing on an open account.
and agreed to release each partner from any other portion of the debt
than that covered by his note, and accepted the notes as a full discharge
of each partner from the residue of the account. Hld, that the con-
tract was binding on the creditor, and that he could not maintain a suit
on the account against a partner who had paid the note so accepted for
his share of the debt: Maxicell v. Day, 45 Ind.
The taking of a note, with or without security, from one of several
joint debtors for a pre-existing debt, is a payment, when it is expressly
agreed that it is taken as payment and at the risk of the creditor: Id.
Aqreement b'etwceen Partners-et-off.-A. and B., being partners,
dissolved their partnership, A. giving his note to B. for his interest in
the partnership property, and agreeing to pay all the partnership debts
except a note to one S., which B. assumed and agreed to pay. In a
suit by B. against A. on the note of the latter. A. answered by way of
set-off the agreement of B. to pay the note held by S., averring that it
was due and wholly unpaid, and that he, A., was personally liable for
the amount thereof. Held, that the answer was a good defence to an
amount equal to the note due to S. ield, also, that an answer of set-
off is not demurrable for assuming to answer the entire complaint, al-
though the set-off is shown to be for a sum less than the plaintiff's
demand. The answer is good to the extent of the set-off: .Mullendore
v. Sott, 45 Ind.
PRESUMPTION OF PAYMENT. See Mortgaye.
PUBLIC LANDS.
Government Su -ves-Of Paramount Authorty.-The purchaser of
government lands acquires, by his patent, title to all of the land em-
braced within the boundary lines of the tract purchased, even though
the survey be inaccurate, for the boundaries' when found, must control
the notes and plat of the survey. The plat and notes of the survey are
intended to represent what was done in the field, and must yield to the
lines and courses when found: Sawyer v. Cox, 63 Ill.
RAILROAD.
Injuries to Employees-Negligence.-In an action against a railroad
company for injuries to plaintiff received in coupling a car loaded with
timber projecting over the end thereof, the defendant asked the court
to instruct the jury, that "if the car which hurt plaintiff was loaded as
loads of timber had been usually and commonly loaded and carried over
defendants' and other railroads, then it was not negligence in defendant
to carry the timber upon which plaintiff was hurt." Held, that the in-
struction was properly refused, on the ground that if the manner of
carriage was negligent, the habit of defendant or other roads in that
respect, would not relieve defendant from liability: Hamilton v. R. R.
Co., 36 Iowa.
The following instruction was also asked: "If it was the usual and
common custom of defendants' railroad to carry projecting timbers on
ears, the same as when plaintiff was hurt, then it was plaintiff's duty to
watch and look for such projecting timbers and avoid them; and if he
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did not when he could or should have done so he is not entitled to
recover." Held, that the instruction was properly refused, on the
ground that it required of plaintiff the exercise of more than ordinary
care and foresight: 1l
Itarn y to Cattle-Fence.-WA here a portion of the fence of a railroad
was burned, and one week thereafter cattle entered upon the track
through the opening so caused, and were injured by a passing train;
Ikihl, that the delay in repairing the fence was unreasonably long, and
that the railroad company was liable for the injury to the cattle : C., C.,
0. & 1. R. R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Ind.
Fence-Killing Animals.-A cow got upon a railroad track and was
killed by a passing locomotive, at a point on said railroad where there
was a saw-mill located and in operation fifty feet from said track, the
intervening ground between said track and said mill being used by the
owners of the mill for piling their lumber and for loading lumber
upon the cars of the railroad company for transportation, and by the
public for passing to and from said mill with logs and lumber, and for
piling wood to be sold to the railroad company. Hehl, that the railroad
company was not bound to fence in the track at such point: and, in the
absence of negligence, was not liable for the killing of the cow: P., C.
& St. L. R. IF Co. v. Bowyer, 45 Ind.
SALE.
Marran y-Reliance on.-Where the seller of personal property
which is unsound warrants it to be sound, the purchaser has a right to
rely on the warranty, though he may have an opportunity t6 examine
the property: First National Bank v. Grindstaff, 45 Ind.
Maranty-Pleading.-To an action on a promissory note, the de-
fendant answered that it was given for a threshing-machine, of plain-
tiff's manufacture, and that the plaintiff warranted it to be a good
machine and capable of doing good work, when, in fict, it would not
operate at all, and was utterly worthless, as plaintiff well knew. Held,
that the answer was good. The machine being worthless, an offer to
redeliver it to the seller was unnecessary: Dill v. O'Ferrell, 45 Ind.
SLANDER.
Justification-Evildcece.-In an action of slander for an alleged
charge of a crime against plaintiff, an answer of justification on the
ground that the charge was true can be sustained only by proof of its
truth beyond a reasonable doubt, by such evidence as would justify a
conviction on an indictment fir the offence : Tucker v. Call, 45 Ind.
In an action of slander the plaintiff must prove the speaking of
enough of the words alleged in the complaint to constitute the slander-
ous charge complained of, and not other or equivalent words : 11.
Justification-Degree of Proof--Tn an action for slanderous words
importing that the plaintiff, an unmarried female, submitted to sexual
intercourse resulting in her pregnancy, under an answer alleging the
truth of the words spoken, the court instructed the jury that the
defendant must have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
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plaintiff was a woman of bad character and had been guilty.of fornica-
tion as in said answer alleged. Reld, that this was error; that it was
sufficient to prove the truth of the words, not beyond a reasonable doubt,
but by a preponderance of evidence, without proving that the plaintiff
was a woman of bad character: Wilson v. Barnett, 45 Ind.
STREET. See Municipal Corporation.
SURETY. See Bond; Guaranty.
Mortgage to Indemnify-Payment of Money by Surety or by Principd
with Surety's Mone.-Where an acconnodnition endorser of notes took
from the principal debtor a mortgage conditioned to save the endorser
harmless, and to pay him all money he might be compelled to pay, and
might pay, on account of such endorsements; and at the maturity of
the notes, having been informed by the principal that he could not and
would not pay the same, the endorser, in order to save the notes from
going to protest, paid the same without protest. Held, that this was a
payment within the purview of the condition of the mortgage. for which
the endorser was entitled to the benefit of the mortgage security : .Ta-
tional State Bank v. Davis, 24 Ohio St.
Where such principal debtor had in his bands money of the accom-
modation endorser, or was indebted to him, in a sum equalling the
amount due upon the endorsed notes, and in pursuance of an agreement
between them, and with the intention to preserve the endorser's inort-
gage security, the money so in the bands of the principal debtor, or so
due from him, was applied by him in paymernt of the notes, and charged
to the endorser as money paid on his account, and the notes so paid
delivered to him. Reld, that this was in law a payment by the endorser
and not by the principal debtor: Id.
Co-sureties-Judgment.-When two sureties are sued upon a promis-
sory note, one of them who* has paid half the note is not entitled to an
order directing the sheriff to levy an execution that may be issued to
collect the residue upon the property of his co-surety exclusively. The
creditor has his remedy against all the makers for all of the debt; and
sections 674 and 675 of the Code only authorize the court to order that.
the property of the principal shall be sold before resort is had to that
of the surety : Schooley v. Fletcher et al., 45 Ind.
It is only when one surety has paid more than his share of the lia-
bility that he can call upon a co-surety for contribution : 11.
E'xtension of Time-Interest.-An agreement in writing to pay an in-
creased rate of interest, made by the principal maker with the holder
of a promissory note, is a good consideration for an extension of the time
of payment; and when the agreement is to extend for a definite period
without the consent of the surety, it will discharge the surety : Hiuff v.
Cole, 45 Ind.
An agreement to pay an increased rate of interest thereafter, endorsed
on a promissory note, made by the principal only, without the know-
ledge or consent of the surety, does not of itself change, alter or super-
sede the contract evidenced by the face of the note; and in a suit
against the surety, the note is proper evidence to be given to the jury.
Harden v. Wof 2 Ind. 31, explained: Id.
